Shared knowledge and interpersonal coordination are prerequisites for most forms of social behavior. Influential approaches to joint action have conceptualized these capacities in relation to the separate constructs of co-representation (knowledge) and self-other entrainment (coordination). Here we investigated how brain mechanisms involved in co-representation and entrainment interact to support joint action. To do so, we used a musical joint action paradigm to show that the neural mechanisms underlying co-representation and self-other entrainment are linked via a process -indexed by EEG alpha oscillations -regulating the balance between self-other integration and segregation in real time. Pairs of pianists performed short musical items while action familiarity and interpersonal (behavioral) synchronization accuracy were manipulated in a factorial design. Action familiarity referred to whether or not pianists had rehearsed the musical material performed by the other beforehand. Interpersonal synchronization was manipulated via congruent or incongruent tempo change instructions that biased performance timing towards the impending, new tempo. It was observed that, when pianists were familiar with each other's parts, millisecond variations in interpersonal synchronized behavior were associated with a modulation of alpha power over right centro-parietal scalp regions. Specifically, high behavioral entrainment was associated with self-other integration, as indexed by alpha suppression. Conversely, low behavioral entrainment encouraged reliance on internal knowledge and thus led to selfother segregation, indexed by alpha enhancement. These findings suggest that alpha oscillations index the processing of information about self and other depending on the compatibility of internal knowledge and external (environmental) events at finely resolved timescales.
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Introduction
Interpersonal coordination and shared knowledge are two critical building blocks of social behavior. These constructs make up the foundation upon which most of our everyday interactions are built, and from which complex behaviors, including verbal and non-verbal communication, might have evolved (Greenfield, 1994; Tomasello et al., 2005; Merker et al., 2009 ). Whether social interactions are possible depends on the brain capacity to integrate (internal) self-generated actions with the (external) motor output of other individuals while maintaining a distinction between self and other in order to achieve autonomous control of one's actions. This capacity for simultaneous action control (related to the Self), action monitoring (related to Others), and self-other integration and segregation have been mostly investigated with respect to two constructs: self-other entrainment (Tognoli et al., 2007; Dumas et al., 2010; Naeem et al., 2012a , Tognoli & Kelso 2014 ) and corepresentation (Sebanz et al., 2003 (Sebanz et al., , 2006a Knoblich and Sebanz, 2008) . These constructs originate from dynamical vs. cognitive systems approaches to social interaction, respectively, which are associated with physically based vs. mental phenomena.
Self-other entrainment, defined broadly, involves the synchronization or spatiotemporal coordination of actions within a group of individuals having a social or communicative function (Clayton et al., 2005; Phillips-Silver and Keller, 2012; Cacioppo et al., 2014; Keller et al., 2014) . Self-other entrainment, in humans as in other species such as fireflies, crickets, and frogs (Merker, 2000) , underlies elementary (often spontaneous) forms of social behavior that might be ultimately important for the survival of a group and for reproduction (Greenfield, 1994; Merker et al., 2009) . In humans, interpersonal entrainment is observable in several kinds of social interactions, from walking with another individual to team sport and musical or dance ensembles (McGarry et al., 2002; van Ulzen et al., 2008; Keller et al., 2014 
